Exceptions or "Safe Harbors. Below are a few examples, summarized. In addition to invalidating the BCRA provision setting forth aggregate contribution limits, discussed above, the Supreme Court has also invalidated the BCRA provisions establishing limits on contributions whose opponents significantly self-finance and the limits on contributions by minors. Furthermore, in a ruling that provided the legal underpinning for the establishment of super PACs, an appellate court has ruled that limits on contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures are unconstitutional.
The following sections of the report briefly examine these rulings. In , the Court held, in Davis v. Federal Election Commission , that a statute establishing a series of staggered increases in contribution limits for candidates whose opponents significantly self-finance their campaigns violates the First Amendment, because the penalty imposed on expenditures of personal funds is not justified by the compelling governmental interest of lessening corruption or its appearance.
Similarly, for Senate candidates, a separate provision generally raised individual contribution limits for a candidate whose opponent exceeded a designated threshold level of personal campaign funding that was based on the number of eligible voters in the state. While acknowledging the long history of jurisprudence upholding the constitutionality of individual contribution limits, the Court emphasized its definitive rejection of any limits on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech.
Although conceding that the Millionaire's Amendment did not directly impose a limit on a candidate's expenditure of personal funds, the Court concluded that it impermissibly required a candidate to make a choice between the right of free political expression and being subjected to discriminatory contribution limits, and created a fundraising advantage for his or her opponents. In , in McConnell v. F ederal Election Commission , by a unanimous vote, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional under the First Amendment a BCRA provision 98 prohibiting individuals age 17 or younger from making contributions to candidates and political parties.
In response to the government's assertion that such a prohibition protects against corruption by conduit—that is, parents donating through their minor children to circumvent contribution limits—the Court saw little evidence to support the existence of this type of evasion.
Providing the legal underpinning for the creation of super PACs, in , the U. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia D. Circuit held that limits on contributions to groups making only independent expenditures are unconstitutional. Circuit, in SpeechNow. F ederal E lection C ommission , concluded that campaign contributions to groups making only independent expenditures similarly do not give rise to corruption.
In Citizens United , the Court relied, in part, on its ruling in Buckley holding that expenditures made "totally independently"—in other words, not coordinated with any candidate or party—do not create a risk of corruption or its appearance, and therefore, cannot be constitutionally limited.
Circuit in SpeechNow. The SpeechNow. For example, the FEC concluded that a corporation that is exempt from tax under Section c 4 of the Internal Revenue Code may establish and administer a political committee that makes only independent expenditures, and may accept unlimited contributions from individuals.
Should Congress decide to enact legislation that further restricts campaign contributions, the Supreme Court's campaign finance jurisprudence provides guidance as to the constitutional bounds reviewing courts may apply to such limits. More broadly, and perhaps most instructive for Congress in evaluating further legislative options, the Court has stated unequivocally, in McCutcheon , that the only legitimate justification for limiting campaign contributions is avoiding quid pro quo candidate corruption or its appearance.
In contrast, while acknowledging that Congress may seek to accomplish other "well intentioned" policy goals—such as lessening influence over or access to elected officials, decreasing the costs of campaigns, and equalizing financial resources among candidates—the Court has announced that such interests will not serve to justify contribution limits. As discussed in earlier sections of this report, traditionally, the Court has subjected contribution limits to less rigorous scrutiny under the First Amendment than expenditure limits, and therefore, with some significant exceptions, the Court has generally upheld such limits.
Furthermore, a stricter standard of review could likewise result in successful challenges to existing contribution limits, including the limits on individual contributions to candidates and parties. Looking ahead, there are at least two cases recently appealed to the Supreme Court which, should the Court review, could potentially shed light on the constitutional bounds of contribution limits and provide Congress with guidance for evaluating legislative options.
By a 2-to-1 vote, in Lair v. Motl , the U. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Ninth Circuit upheld a Montana law establishing limits for how much individuals, political action committees, and parties could contribute to state candidates.
The Ninth Circuit held that the limits were justified by and adequately tailored to the government's interest in avoiding quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. Likewise, in Zimmerman v. City of Austin , a unanimous three-judge panel of the U. In addition to limits on how much a donor may contribute to a campaign, federal campaign finance law contains several bans—referred to as "source restrictions"—on who may make campaign contributions.
The following sections of the report discuss key aspects of source restrictions, beginning with the ban on campaign contributions by corporations and labor unions and the Supreme Court's invalidation of limits on corporate and union independent spending on campaigns. Next, the report discusses the bans on campaign contributions by federal contractors and on contributions and expenditures by foreign nationals. Finally, the report assesses key Supreme Court holdings that may be instructive in evaluating the constitutionality of policy options, should Congress consider legislation regarding the sources of campaign contributions.
FECA prohibits corporations and labor unions from making campaign contributions from their own funds or "general treasuries. Providing the most recent precedent on this restriction, in , in Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont , the Court upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition on corporations making direct campaign contributions from their general treasuries in connection with federal elections.
In the landmark decision of Citizens United v. F ederal E lection C ommission , the Supreme Court invalidated two FECA prohibitions on independent electoral spending by corporations and labor unions.
Independent expenditures and electioneering communications are protected speech, the Court announced—regardless of whether the speaker is a corporation—and merely permitting a corporation to engage in independent electoral speech through a PAC does not allow the corporation to speak directly nor does it alleviate the First Amendment burden created by such limits. Bellotti had reaffirmed that the government cannot restrict political speech because the speaker is a corporation.
On the other hand, its decision of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce had permitted a restriction on such speech in order to avoid corporations having disproportionate economic power in elections. In Bellotti , the Court struck down a state law prohibiting corporate independent expenditures related to referenda. In contrast, the Court in Austin upheld a state law prohibiting, and imposing criminal penalties on, corporate independent expenditures that supported or opposed any candidate for state office.
According to the Court in Citizens United , in order to "bypass Buckley and Bellotti ," the Court in Austin had identified a new governmental interest justifying limits on political speech, the "antidistortion interest.
Independent expenditures, the Court announced, including those made by corporations, do not cause corruption or the appearance of corruption. In Citizens United , in addition to the ban on corporations and labor unions using their general treasury funds for independent expenditures, the Court also struck down the ban on the use of such funds for electioneering communications.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. WRTL , had narrowed the definition of an electioneering communication in order to mitigate concerns that the law could prohibit First Amendment protected issue speech, known as issue advocacy. In WRTL , the Court interpreted the term to encompass only express advocacy for example, communications stating "vote for" or "vote against" or the "functional equivalent" of express advocacy.
That is, the Court advised that communications that could reasonably be interpreted as something other than an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate should not be considered electioneering communications.
Despite the limiting principle imposed by WRTL , the Court in Citizens United observed that both prohibitions were a "ban on speech" in violation of the First Amendment. Also of note, the statute prohibiting corporate expenditures contained an exception that permitted corporations to use their treasury funds to establish, administer, and solicit contributions to a PAC in order to make expenditures. Another type of source restriction—known as a "pay-to-play" prohibition—bans federal office candidates from accepting or soliciting contributions from federal government contractors.
This FECA prohibition applies at any time between the earlier of the commencement of contract negotiations or when the requests for proposals are sent out, and the termination of negotiations or completion of contract performance, whichever is later.
In , a unanimous en banc U. Circuit D. Circuit upheld the ban on campaign contributions by federal government contractors, limiting the application of its ruling to the ban on contractors making contributions to candidates, parties, and traditional PACs that make contributions to candidates and parties.
Circuit, the federal ban serves "sufficiently important" government interests by guarding against quid pro quo corruption and its appearance, and protecting merit-based administration. Circuit, because the risk of quid pro quo corruption and its appearance has not dissipated. According to the D. Circuit, this suggests that if the ban were no longer in effect, "more money in exchange for contracts would flow through the same channels already on display.
FECA generally prohibits foreign nationals from donating or spending money in connection with any U. The Act further prohibits foreign nationals from making expenditures; independent expenditures; or disbursements for electioneering communications. In addition, FECA regulations further specify that foreign nationals are prohibited from directing or participating in the decisionmaking process of entities involved in U.
For example, the FEC has determined that a U. In , the Supreme Court summarily affirmed a three-judge federal district court panel ruling that upheld the constitutionality of the prohibition on foreign nationals making campaign contributions and independent expenditures. Federal Election Commission , a federal district court held that for the purposes of First Amendment analysis, the United States has a compelling interest in limiting foreign citizen participation in American democratic self-government, thereby preventing foreign influence over the U.
As discussed above in the section on contribution limits, some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court in in McCutcheon may have signaled a willingness in future cases to evaluate contribution limits under a stricter standard of review than it has in the past. Moreover, one commentator has argued that, in Citizens United , the Court rejected the rationale behind the leading precedent upholding the ban on corporate contributions in Beaumont , thereby raising the prospect that in a future case, the Court could have another basis for overturning the ban on corporate contributions.
On the other hand, as discussed above, the district court's ruling in Bluman , which the Supreme Court affirmed in , seems to suggest that legislation to enhance the current ban on foreign nationals donating or spending money in connection with U. As Bluman upheld the ban on foreign nationals only to the extent that it applied to express advocacy or its functional equivalent, legislation that broadly regulates issue advocacy may be constitutionally vulnerable. FECA sets forth both disclaimer and disclosure requirements.
The term disclaimer generally refers to statements of attribution that appear directly on a campaign-related communication, and the term disclosure generally refers to requirements for periodic reporting to the FEC, which are made available for public inspection. The following sections of the report provide an overview of FECA disclaimer and disclosure requirements, relevant Supreme Court rulings, and a discussion of constitutional considerations for legislation, should Congress decide to enact legislation to enhance or modify such requirements.
Although FECA does not contain the term "disclaimer," the Act specifies the content of attribution statements to be included in certain communications, which are known as disclaimer requirements.
For radio and television advertisements by candidate committees, FECA generally requires that the communication state who paid for the ad, along with an audio statement by the candidate identifying the candidate and stating that the candidate "has approved" the message.
Generally, for non-candidate-authorized communications—including ads financed by outside groups, corporations, and labor unions—FECA likewise requires a disclaimer to clearly state the name and permanent street address, telephone number, or website address of the person who paid for the communication and state that the communication was not authorized by any candidate or candidate committee. In addition, in television advertisements, the statement is required to be conveyed by an unobscured, full-screen view of a representative of the entity paying for the ad, in a voice-over, along with a written message of attribution at the end of the communication.
The FEC is required to make these reports publicly available on the internet within 48 hours of receipt or within 24 hours if the report is filed electronically.
The FEC is also required to make the reports available for public inspection in their offices. Until a recent court ruling discussed below, the donor disclosure regulation promulgated under the Act generally applied only to those donors who contributed money specifically "for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure.
This "purpose requirement" for donor disclosure, however, has been challenged in court. State resources belong to the whole population and should not be used to favor any political party or candidate. Use of state resources in the context of an election campaign should be considered a type of campaign finance contribution and be reported accordingly to help avoid their abuse. Information about direct and indirect public funding for candidates and parties during an election campaign allows citizens, contestants and officials to assess whether state resources were used in a fair and appropriate manner.
Public campaign financing data includes information about public campaign finance limits and regulations, the amounts disbursed to each candidate or party through direct campaign financing mechanisms and allocations of public resources to each candidate or party through indirect campaign financing mechanisms.
Private campaign funding encourages citizen participation in the electoral process and allows voters to express political opinions by supporting contestants who represent their interests.
Private campaign financing can reduce the role or interference of government in campaigning, reducing the potentials for incumbent governments to manipulate public funding for its electoral advantage. Additionally, political parties may make donations to candidates, and candidates may use their personal resources to finance their campaigns.
Parties and candidates may also take out loans to finance campaign activities. Candidates and parties should be required to report on the private donations they receive, including the source, date, and amount of the donation.
Access to information about donations from individuals and other private donors can reveal any potential conflict of interest the candidate or party may have when making a policy or acting in government. Likewise, information about private funding for candidates and parties, including limits on individual donations, allows citizens, contestants and officials to monitor private campaign financing activities in relation to legal restrictions.
Data about private campaign financing includes information about private campaign finance limits and regulations, as well as the source of private donations, and the amounts and dates of donations.
Campaign expenditures generally include any expenditure for electoral purposes, monetary or in-kind, by a candidate or party during an electoral campaign. These limits can promote a level playing-field for candidates, but must be balanced with the equally legitimate need to protect other rights, such as freedoms of association and expression. The maximum spending limit usually consists of an absolute sum or a relative sum, determined by factors such as the voting population in a particular constituency and the costs of campaign materials and services.
Whichever system is adopted, such limits should be clearly defined in the law and, ideally, be indexed for inflation to ensure that they stay relevant for subsequent elections. Limitations should also apply to all electoral contestants, to prevent them being used as vehicles to circumvent spending limits. Electoral contestants must be permitted to expend sufficient resources to convey their political message.
Campaign expenditure limits should be clearly defined by law. Contestants use limit information to ensure they act within the law, while citizens can use it to hold parties and candidates accountable.
Expenditure data at the most primary level should include transaction-level information including cost and recipient of funds or goods. Citizens can use information on campaign expenditures to make more informed choices among contestants. For expenditure data, it is good practice to report on the date, purpose, amount and recipient of each transaction. Reporting and disclosure of campaign finance information makes candidates and political parties accountable to both the campaign finance oversight body and to the general public for how they finance their campaigns.
In AO , the Commission determined that the value of an in-kind contribution of used computer equipment, received before the primary and designated in writing by the contributors for all elections in the cycle, could, in fact, be allocated among all elections in the same election cycle. The contribution was distinguishable from the type of in-kind contribution that is used for one particular election such as printing or mailing costs related to a general election fundraiser.
If the candidate had lost the primary election, the committee would have had to refund the amount designated for the general election in this case, the candidate was active in each election within the election cycle. The Commission did not address the issue of allocating an in-kind contribution over more than one election cycle.
The date a contribution is made by the contributor and the date the contribution is received by the campaign are significant for purposes of the contribution limits. It is important to understand the distinction. The date a contribution is made is the date the contributor relinquishes control over it For example:. This is the date used by the campaign for reporting purposes, but it also affects the application of the net debts outstanding rule. In-kind contributions The date of receipt for an in-kind contribution is the date the goods or services are provided to the committee, even if the contributor pays the bill for the goods or services after they are provided.
AO Attribution of contribution to proper election cycle. AO Contributions earmarked for potential candidates. AO Limits, prohibitions and reporting requirements apply to recount activities. AO Reporting in-kind contribution of office space. AO In-kind contributions designated for more than one election. AO Operating a political committee in cyberspace.
AO Utah convention as separate election. AO Extension of time for redesignations of general election contributions to primary loser. AO Pre-election reporting requirement for unopposed candidate. AO State party convention not election; general election contribution received and spent before primary.
This information is not intended to replace the law or to change its meaning, nor does this information create or confer any rights for or on any person or bind the Federal Election Commission or the public.
Your web browser is not supported You're using Internet Explorer, some features might not work. Contribution limits for federal elections How limits work Designated and undesignated contributions Date made v. Print the contribution limits chart. Access archived contribution limit charts for past election cycles. A variety of campaign finance systems exist around the world, ranging from loose sets of legislation to tightly regulated legal frameworks.
Within this large array of systems, some regulations are more common than others. The graphic below figure 1 shows the percentage of countries using the different types of campaign finance regulations.
The figures mentioned below are based on the International IDEA political finance database [1] and are only related to regulations applicable to the financing of electoral campaigns in the countries surveyed for the database.
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